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The recent United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mendenhall’ is notable
not for what the Court did decide, but for what the Court could not decide.
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The recent United States Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Mendenhall' is notable not for what the Court did decide, but for what
the Court could not decide. The case's central issue, the constitutional-
ity of the use of "drug courier profiles" by narcotics agents in airports
to stop and search persons suspected of drug trafficking, was left un-
resolved by a splintered court.
The case reached the Court pursuant to a motion to suppress her-
oin allegedly acquired through an unconstitutional search and seizure 2
by Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents. The Supreme
Court granted certiorari "to consider whether any right of the respon-
dent guaranteed by the [f]ourth [a]mendmet was violated." 3
In resolving the issues presented in Mendenhall,' the Supreme
Court reviewed the use by DEA agents of the "drug courier profile,"
which is an "informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought
typical of persons carrying illicit drugs. ' 5 According to the DEA, the
following conduct is exhibited consistently by drug couriers, and indi-
cates that criminal activity is afoot. A person is suspicious when he:
(1) arrives on a flight from a source city,8
(2) is the last passenger to deplane,
(3) is very nervous,
(4) scans the whole terminal,
(5) carries or picks up no baggage,
1. - U.S. ., 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
2. Id. at 1873.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1873 n.l. The "drug courier profile" has also been
described as a "check list of recurrent characteristics." United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d
320, 326 (2d Cir. 1978).
6. The place of origin for controlled substances brought into the airport in which
the DEA agents are stationed. - U.S. at .. , 100 S. Ct. at 1873; United States v. Price,
599 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1979).
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(6) changes airlines for a flight out of the airport,
(7) uses currency in small denominations for ticket purchases,
(8) remains in the drug import centers, (or the source city) for
only a short stopover, and
(9) uses one or more alias.7
Once a DEA agent detects a suspicious person fitting this drug
courier profile, the agent approaches the suspect, identifies himself, and
asks to see the suspect's identification and ticket. It is this initial stop
and questioning which raises the issue of whether any of the suspect's
fourth amendment rights have been violated.
The Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of the initial stop and
questioning of Ms. Mendenhall based upon the "drug courier profile.",
The majority further found that the subsequent search and seizure of
Ms. Mendenhall was lawful and not violative of any constitutionally
protected rights because she had voluntarily accompanied the DEA
agents to their airport office, and had voluntarily consented and submit-
ted to a strip search revealing the heroin.9
ISSUES PRESENTED
The majority's opinion, however, did not set forth concise guide-
7. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1873 n.1. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d
1338 (2d Cir. 1979). United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979). United
States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978). United States v. McCaleb, 512 F.2d
717 (6th Cir. 1977). It is interesting to note that many of the characteristics of the
"drug courier profile" often used to justify an initial encounter or investigatory stop
and comprise part of the "reasonable suspicion" cannot be ascertained until after the
individual is approached and questioned. For example, the conduct of (1) using one or
more alias, (2) remaining in the drug import centers or source cities for only a short
stopover and (3) traveling under an unusual itinerary, can be ascertained only after
stopping the suspect and asking for his ticket and identification. In such situations,
these characteristics cannot contribute to the "reasonable suspicion" that criminal ac-
tivity is afoot which is necessary to lawfully intrude upon an individual's fourth amend-
ment rights. Some courts, however, have recognized that the information acquired dur-
ing the investigatory encounter cannot be used to justify it. United States v. Rico, 594
F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1979). United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir.
1977). United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977).
8. - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
9. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
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lines for use in resolving future cases, nor did the Court resolve all of
the issues presented in the case. Three questions remain to be answered
by the Court. First, whether actions of a passenger, consistent with the
"drug courier profile," provide the agents with probable cause to stop,
question, and seize the suspect. Second, whether such suspicious con-
duct supplies the agents with "reasonable suspicion," something less
than probable cause, which under the fourth amendment authorizes a
minimally intrusive stop and questioning. Third, whether agents can
stop and question a suspect whose conduct falls within the purview of
the "drug courier profile" without invoking fourth amendment
protections.
Thus the question remains: Does the use of the "drug courier pro-
file" (a means of providing agents with a cloak of authority to act on
their "hunches") invest the agents with unfettered discretion to intrude
on the rights of citizens? Inherent in this issue is the recognition that
the conduct compiled in the "drug courier profile" is often logically
consistent with innocent behavior, and may result in passengers being
unnecessarily detained and their constitutional rights infringed upon to
a greater or lesser degree.
Since the majority of the Supreme Court was divided on the issues
concerning the initial contact between the federal agents and the sus-
pect, the lower courts will have to address and resolve these questions
on a case by case analysis.
FACTS
The fact pattern in Mendenhall,1" played a major role in the Su-
preme Court's decision. The incident occurred in the Detroit Metropol-
itan Airport where DEA agents were stationed to detect unlawful nar-
cotic traffic. Two agents observed Ms. Mendenhall as she arrived in the
airport and proceeded through the terminal. Ms. Mendenhall's conduct
was suspicious insofar as the agents viewed it as being consistent with
the characteristics of the "drug courier profile." '11
The agents approached Ms. Mendenhall, identified themselves,
and asked to see her identification and ticket. Ms. Mendanhall pro-
10. - U.S. , 100 S. Ct. 1870.
11. Id. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1873-74.
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duced a driver's license in the name of Sylvia Mendenhall and an air-
line ticket issued in the name of Annette Ford, triggering further in-
quiry by the federal agents. 12
In response to questioning, Ms. Mendenhall stated she had spent
only two days in California. According to the "profile," this factor is
indicative of illegal conduct since drug couriers while transporting nar-
cotics often make brief stops in diverse cities. Additionally, when Agent
Anderson specifically identified himself as a federal narcotics agent,
Ms. Mendenhall became extremely nervous and had difficulty
speaking.13
Based on Ms. Mendenhall's suspicious conduct, Agent Anderson
asked if she would accompany the agents to the airport DEA office for
further questioning.1 4 The record does not include Ms. Mendenhall's
verbal response to this question, but merely recites that she accompa-
nied the agents to the office. Once at the office, an agent asked Ms.
Mendenhall if she would permit a search of her person and handbag.
She responded, "go ahead."1 5 When a policewoman arrived to conduct
the search, she asked the agents if Ms. Mendenhall had consented to
the search, and the agents said she had. After the policewoman and
Ms. Mendenhall had entered another room, the policewoman asked
Ms. Mendenhall if she had consented to the search and she replied
affirmatively. The policewoman then told Ms. Mendenhall that she
12. Id.
13. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1874. Nervousness is one characteristic of the "drug
courier profile" which is often misleading and not indicative of criminal activity. Very
often individuals traveling through airports are nervous and confused due to the hectic
and unfamiliar surroundings. Government officials acting on their hunches can label
conduct as "extremely nervous," thereby fitting it into the profile. Thus the officers can
justify approaching almost any individual walking through an airport terminal. An ex-
ample of detectives acting merely on a hunch occurred in Berg v. State, 384 So. 2d 292
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), wherein the detectives observed Berg walking through
the terminal in an extremely nervous manner. As Berg approached the metal detector
he was shaking with an overall appearance of apprehension. Since the detectives viewed
this conduct as consistent with the "drug courier profile" they approached and asked to
speak with Berg. After receiving permission to inspect his bags, they discovered a white
powdery laxative which they proceeded to field test three or four times. In reality, Berg
was a diabetic suffering from the preliminary stages of insulin shock. The court found
that the detectives were acting upon "nothing more than mere suspicion." Id. at 293.
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would have to disrobe, and in response, Ms. Mendenhall stated that she
"had a plane to catch."16 After being assured by the policewoman that
there would be no delay if she were not carrying narcotics, Ms. Men-
denhall disrobed without further comment. As she was disrobing, Ms.
Mendenhall handed to the policewoman two packages from her cloth-
ing, one of which appeared to contain heroin. The agents then arrested
Ms. Mendenhall for possession of contraband. 17
THE SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS
1. The Fourth Amendment's Applicability
The Supreme Court began its factual analysis by establishing that
Ms. Mendenhall, as she walked through the airport, was protected by
the fourth amendment18 which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath,
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
persons and things to be seized.19
In Katz v. United States,20 the Supreme Court held that the
fourth amendment protects "people, not places,"'" and thus established
that the fourth amendment protects more than an "'area' viewed in the
abstract." 22 The fourth amendment protects what an individual "seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public."23
"[Tihis inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the
citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his
study to dispose of secret affairs." 24 Additionally, the Supreme Court
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at ., 100 S. Ct. at 1875.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. Id. at 351.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
145 1Drug Courier Profiles15:1980
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has recognized that "no right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint of in-
terference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law."2 5
2. Was There a "Seizure" of Ms. Mendenhall?
After establishing that Ms. Mendenhall was clothed with constitu-
tional safeguards, the Supreme Court turned its attention to whether
the actions of the DEA agents violated her constitutional rights. In its
analysis, the majority's consensus broke down. Justice Stewart was
joined only by Justice Rehnquist in Part II-A of his opinion, which
concluded that Ms. Mendenhall was not "seized" since fourth amend-
ment safeguards were not triggered when she was approached and
questioned by the DEA agents.2 6 Justice Powell, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred in the result, but found
that Ms. Mendenhall was seized within the meaning of the fourth
amendment."
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist stated their belief that police of-
ficers can question people in the street without the officers' conduct
falling within the parameters of the fourth amendment as long as the
individual being questioned has not been "seized." In this situation,
there is "no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would
under the constitution require some particularized and objective justifi-
cation." 28 According to Justices Stewart and Rehnquist when such en-
counters occur between officials and citizens, the citizens can ignore the
25. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
26. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1873. In United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036,
the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of when a seizure occurs in an encounter be-
tween police officers and citizens. In its step by step analysis, the court made a refined
judgment as to exactly when the seizure occurred. The court concluded that no seizure
occurred until the agent took the suspect's ticket to the airline counter to check the
suspect's story. The court arrived at this decision since the encounter involved no force,
no physical contact, and no show of authority other than when the agents identified
themselves as federal law enforcement officials. Id. at 1042.
27. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
28. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
1 146 5:19801
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questions addressed to them and freely walk away.19
3. Terry's Guidelines
Following this premise, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist state that
"the distinction between an intrusion amounting to a 'seizure' of the
person, and an encounter that intrudes upon no constitutionally pro-
tected interest is illustrated by the facts in Terry v. Ohio."30
In Terry, the Supreme Court was dealing with an encounter be-
tween a citizen and a policeman on patrol investigating suspicious cir-
cumstances. The plainclothes policeman observed two men standing on
a corner. One of them walked past some stores and looked specifically
into one store window. While on his return to the corner, the man again
spied into the same store window, and upon arriving at the corner, the
two men again conferred briefly with each other. The second man re-
peated this routine and peered twice into the same store window. These
two men made twelve trips: "pacing, peering, and conferring." 31 At one
point, as the two men were conversing on the corner, they were joined
by a third man. After observing these three men for twelve minutes,
the police officer was "thoroughly suspicious. '3 2 He approached them,
"identified himself as a police officer and asked for their names." 33
The Court stated that "at this point his [the policeman's] knowl-
edge was confined to what he [had] observed. He was not acquainted
with any of the three men by name or sight, and he had received no
information concerning them from any other source. '34
In response to the officer's question, the three men "mumbled
something."3 5 Instantaneously, the officer "grabbed petitioner Terry,
29. Id. However, courts have recognized that encounters between citizens and
officials often inherently involve restraints on individuals' freedom to freely walk away.
The cloak of authority surrounding a government official often results in submission on
the part of citizens, who are not free to disregard the demands of officers. Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1848). State v. Frost, 374 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1979).
30. 392 U.S. 1.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 6-7.
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spun him around .... and patted down the outside of his clothing." 6
In Terry v. Ohio, the majority found that the police officer
"seized" the petitioner "when he took hold of him and patted down the
outer surfaces of his clothing." 37 However, after discussing the circum-
stances in Terry, the Court concluded that the seizure was reasonable
despite the interference with Terry's personal security. Thus, there was
no violation of the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures. 8
In Mendenhall,3" by simultaneously discussing the majority and
concurring opinions in Terry, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist suggested
that no "seizure" occurs when a police officer questions a citizen on the
street, since the Court in Terry found that no seizure occurred when
the officer stopped and questioned the three men.40
However, a careful analysis of the opinions in Terry reveals that
the majority of the Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether
a "seizure" took place before the officer physically restrained Terry.
The majority stated in a footnote:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
an investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause for purposes of
"detention" and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves "seizures" of persons. Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
"seizure" has occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty upon this re-
cord whether any "seizure" took place here prior to Officer McFadden's
initiation of physical contact for purposes of searching Terry for weap-
ons. . 41
In his concurring opinion in Terry, Justice White spoke of interro-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id. at 30-31.
39. - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
40. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
41. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d
1036, analyzed the Terry decision concluding that the Court did not discuss the propri-
ety of an investigatory seizure.
1 148 Nova Law Journal 5:19801
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gation during an investigatory stop.4 2 The interpretation given this con-
curring opinion by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist is that since nothing
in the constitution prevents a police officer from addressing questions to
individuals in the streets, constitutional rights are not violated if a per-
son is briefly restrained and questioned. 3
A close analysis of Justice White's separate concurring opinion
reveals that he did not state absolutely that no seizure occurs during a
brief encounter with a police officer. Rather, he set forth that the indi-
vidual's constitutional rights were "not necessarily violated. 44 The ma-
jority of the Supreme Court in Terry specifically did not decide this
issue.45
Analyzing encounters between citizens and police officers demon-
strates that these contacts involve varying degrees of coerciveness.
When a police officer on the beat approaches a citizen and asks, "Sir,
may I talk to you a moment, ' 46 the question suggests that the individ-
ual is free to leave if he so desires.47 On the other hand, when a federal
agent in an airport stops a citizen whose conduct is consistent with the
"drug courier profile," identifies himself as a DEA agent, and asks for
the suspect's identification and ticket, the situation strongly suggests
that the individual is not free to leave, and that any attempt to do so
would be met with opposition.4
In Mendenhall,49 the record clearly showed that Ms. Mendenhall
was not free to ignore the federal agents and walk away. Footnote six
of Justices Stewart and Rehnquist's opinion states that the DEA agents
would have detained Ms. Mendenhall had she attempted to leave.50
The federal agent's subjective intention to restrain the respondent was
relevant insofar as it was conveyed to Ms. Mendenhall.5 1 Unfortu-
42. 392 U.S. at 34.
43. - U.S. at ._., 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
44. 392 U.S. at 35. In fact, Justice White's analysis recognized that the circum-
stances of an encounter were critical. In Terry he agreed that proper circumstances
existed to approach and detain the suspect.
45. Id. at 19 n.16.
46. United States v. Wylie, 569 F.2d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
47. Id.
48. - U.S. , 100 S. Ct. 1870.
49. Id.
50. Id. at ., 100 S. Ct. at 1877 n.6.
51. Id.
149 1
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nately, the record before the Supreme Court did not contain the specif-
ics of the intention conveyed to Ms. Mendenhall. Certainly, the
thoughts, beliefs, and motivations of the participants set the atmo-
sphere of any encounter and may affect their actions during it. Thus, if
the record had been more complete, perhaps it would have shown that
a seizure had occurred. Possibly, a better solution, in a situation where
the record is insufficient in cases involving fourth amendment rights, is
to remand for further evidentiary hearings on the issue 52 rather than to
assume that no seizure occurred. 53
In discussing whether a seizure had occurred during the initial en-
counter in Mendenhall, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist broadly de-
fined "seizure" as "when by means of physical force or a show of au-
thority an [individual's] freedom of movement is restrained."" This
definition encompasses circumstances where no physical force or touch-
ing occurs and where the suspect makes no attempt to leave. Two ex-
amples set forth in Stewart and Rehnquist's opinion include: (1) when
the presence of several officers is threatening; and (2) when the lan-
guage or voice of the officers indicates that the suspect will not be al-
lowed to leave.55 In ascertaining whether a "seizure" occurs in such
circumstances, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist would consider whether
"in view of all the circumstances. . . , a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave." 56
In Mendenhall, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found that no
seizure had occurred during the initial approach since (1) the record
did not contain any evidence that Ms. Mendenhall's actions were re-
strained in any way;57 and (2) the record did not indicate that she had
any objective reason to believe she was not free to end the conversation
and proceed on her way.58 Such evidence was absent from the record
since the parties had argued the case in the lower courts on the as-
sumption that Ms. Mendenhall had been "seized" when she was ap-
52. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1886 (dissenting opinion). Obviously police can talk to
citizens without violating their constitutional rights.
53. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1876.
54. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1878.
58. Id.
10
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proached in the concourse. 9
To the concurring justices, the question of whether Ms. Menden-
hall had been seized was not resolved easily in light of conflicting pre-
cedent.6 0 There is case law supporting a finding that Ms. Mendenhall
was seized by the agents. For example, in Terry v. Ohio,6" the Court
emphasized that "[i]t must be recognized that whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has
'seized' that person."' 62 The Court expanded on this thought, and stated
that when a citizen is "stopped" by police he is "seized" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, and some "specific and articulable"
justification must be shown to "reasonably warrant" the intrusion."
In Brown v. Texas," a case which involved the seizure of an indi-
vidual in circumstances analogous to Mendenhall, the Supreme Court
noted that when the officers approached Brown and asked him to iden-
tify himself, "they performed a seizure of his person subject to the re-
quirements of the [f]ourth [a]mendment." 65 However, "seizures" of in-
dividuals have been found in situations involving less of an intrustion
than that which occurred in Terry. In United States v. Coleman,"6 the
59. Id. at -. , 100 S. Ct. at 1875 n.5, 1885 (dissenting opinion).
60. Id. at -_, 100 S. Ct. at 1880 n.1.
61. 392 U.S. 1.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Id. at 21.
64. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). In Brown, while cruising in a patrol car, two police
officers observed Brown and another man walking away from each other in an alley.
Believing that the two men either had been together or were about to meet until the
patrol car appeared, one officer approached Brown and asked him to identify himself
and to explain what he was doing. When Brown refused to identify himself, the officer
replied that he was in a "high drug problem area." Id. at 48-49. The second officer
then frisked Brown and found nothing.
65. Id. at 50.
66. 450 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1978). In Coleman, a DEA agent observed
Coleman as he deplaned at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport, from a flight arriving
from Los Angeles, "the most significant distribution point for heroin in the country."
Id. at 439. Coleman carried no hand luggage and walked directly through the terminal
without stopping to claim any baggage. A woman met Coleman outside the terminal
and they both proceeded toward the parking lot. The federal agent approached them,
identified himself, and asked Coleman to produce some identification and his airline
ticket.
The court found from the moment that the DEA agent identified himself and began
151 1
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District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan stated that police
officers can subject an individual to a "seizure" during an investigatory
stop by taking advantage of "social pressures which inhibit the suspect
from declining to deal with him [the police officer] . '67 In other words,
the suspect is seized because he is not free to ignore the police officer
and walk away. 8
4. The Concurring Justices Apply a Balancing Approach
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black-
mun, concurred in part and joined in the judgment. Justice Powell as-
sumed that the initial stop constituted a seizure and analyzed the situa-
tion accordingly. The concurring justices stated that they would have
held "the federal agents had reasonable suspicion that the respondent
was engaging in criminal activity and, therefore, that they did not vio-
late the [ffourth [a]mendment by stopping the respondent for routine
questioning." 69
In Mendenhall, since the stop constituted a seizure it had to be
justified in order to satisfy the fourth amendment requirements. The
categories of police conduct into which this encounter could fall were
limited to (1) an investigatory stop which requires reasonable suspicion;
or (2) an arrest or its equivalent which requires probable cause. 0
to ask Coleman questions, a "Terry stop had been effected." Therefore, the stop had to
be based on reasonable suspicion to meet the requirements of the fourth amendment.
The court held that the stop of Coleman was not based on reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and was not constitutionally valid.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
70. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The bulk of the lower court
cases have found that investigatory stops merely based on conduct consistent with the
"drug courier profile" cannot be justified on either probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion grounds. United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320. United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d
913. United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977). State v. Battleman, 347 So.
2d 637 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). State v. Frost, 347 So. 2d 593. However, there
are a few cases that state that there may arise a set of facts in which the existence of
profile characteristics constitute reasonable suspicion to warrant the intrusion of an
investigatory stop. United States v. McCaleb, 522 F.2d 717, 720. State v. Mitchell,
377 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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In Terry v. Ohio,71 the Court established that reasonable investi-
gatory stops satisfy the fourth amendment's proscription against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The Court concluded that the warrant
clause could not apply, as a practical matter, to police conduct which is
"necessarily swift action predicated upon the on the spot observations
of the officer."'72 However, the Court emphasized that police must ob-
tain warrants for searches and seizures whenever practicable.73
In assessing the reasonableness of seizures which are less intrusive
than traditional arrests, courts have used a "balancing test" to assure
that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not arbitrarily
intruded upon by police officers7' "engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime." 5 Whether a stop constitutes a seizure
turns on the circumstances of each case. Some of the factors considered
by courts when determining the reasonableness of a "seizure" include:
"(1) the public interest served by the seizure, (2) the nature and scope
of the intrusion, (3) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement
officer relied in light of his knowledge and expertise, '76 and the individ-
ual's right to personal security and privacy.77
The balancing test applied to fourth amendment issues originated
in Camara v. Municipal Court."8 In that case, the Court was dealing
with the warrant provision of the fourth amendment and the quantum
of evidence necessary to secure a warrant on less than probable cause.
The Court proceeded to apply a "reasonableness" test to this fourth
amendment activity by balancing the "need to search against the inva-
sion which the search entails. 7 9
This balancing test to determine reasonableness of warrants under
the fourth amendment was subsequently applied in Terry v. Ohio8" to a
71. 392 U.S. 1.
72. Id. at 20.
73. Id.
74. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignon-Prince,
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
75. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
76. - U.S. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1881.
77. 443 U.S. at 50-51; 440 U.S. at 654-55; 422 U.S. at 879-83; 392 U.S. at 20-
22.
78. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
79. Id. at 536-37.
80. 392 U.S. 1.
153 1
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"confrontation on the street between [a] citizen and [a] policeman in-
vestigating suspicious circumstances," '81 involving less than probable
cause. As the majority in Terry read the fourth amendment, it prohib-
ited "not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and
seizures."82 The Supreme Court went on to state that "the central in-
quiry under the fourth amendment is reasonableness in all the circum-
stances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal
security."' 3 The Supreme Court then applied the "balancing test" to
determine the reasonableness of the policeman's conduct in stopping
and frisking the suspect and found that the officer was acting upon
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, thus justifying
the intrusion into the individual's constitutionally protected rights."
The concurring justices in Mendenhall,85 applied this balancing
test. First, the justices found a great public interest in detecting indi-
viduals involved in drug trafficking, a great problem "affecting the
health and welfare of our population." 86
Second, the Court considered the DEA's "nationwide program to
intercept drug couriers transporting narcotics between major drug
sources and distribution centers in the United States"87 and found it to
be a well-planned and effective federal law enforcement program." 88
The justices stated that the special training, experience and expertise of
law enforcement officials are factors to be weighed in determining the
reasonableness of the stop.89 The agents' "expertise" considered impor-
tant by the concurring justices, included the use by the agents of the
"drug courier profile . . . [describing] characteristics generally associ-
ated with narcotics traffickers" 90 compiled through the DEA's highly
specialized operation.9 1 The justices stated that an agent's "knowledge
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id. at 9.
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id. at 30.
85. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
86. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1880.
87. Id.
88. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1883.
89. Id.
90. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1881.
91. Id. at _, 100 S. Ct. at 1881, 1883.
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of the methods used in recent criminal activity and the characteristics
of persons engaged in such illegal practices" 92 are among the circum-
stances that can give rise to reasonable suspicion.93 "Law enforcement
officers may rely on the 'characteristics of the area,' and the behavior
of a suspect who appears to be evading police contact." 94 Further, "a
trained law enforcement agent may be 'able to perceive and articulate
meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the un-
trained observer." 95
Third, the justices reviewed the factors which led to the stop and
questioning of Ms. Mendenhall, including that she:
(1) appeared very nervous,
(2) attempted to evade detection,
(3) deplaned after all the other passengers,
(4) scanned the terminal,
(5) walked "'very, very slowly'"96
(6) claimed no baggage, and
(7) changed airlines for the flight out of Detroit.
The district court held that this conduct, observed by the DEA agents
before stopping and questioning Ms. Mendenhall, provided reasonable
suspicion to make the investigatory stop. The concurring justices
agreed with this conclusion.97
The conduct observed by the DEA agents was consistent with the
"drug courier profile." In this case, reliance on this profile demon-
strated reasonable suspicion. However, the justices pointed out that
each case must be "judged on its own facts." 98
Finally, the Court evaluated the intrusion upon Ms. Mendenhall's
rights and found it to be minimal considering that: (1) two plainclothes
agents approached the respondent in a public area; (2) the agents iden-
tified themselves; (3) the agents asked the respondent to produce some
identification and her airline ticket; and (4) the agents asked a few





97. Id. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1883.
98. Id. n.6.
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brief questions. 9
In summary, on the issue of the initial encounter between the
agents and Ms. Mendenhall, the members of the Court only agreed
that the stop was lawful. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist found that
there was no seizure, while Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun as-
sumed there was a seizure but found that it was based- on reasonable
suspicion.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE
What does this decision offer to the lower courts as precedent?
How does the Supreme Court answer the following questions con-
fronting the lower courts?
(1) Is a suspect who is approached by federal agents in an airport
for questioning because his conduct is consistent with the "drug courier
profile" seized within the meaning of the fourth amendment? Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist said "no;" Justices Powell, Burger and Black-
mun did not discuss the question.
(2) Is an initial stop lawful? The majority of the Court said "yes."
(3) Why is the initial stop lawful? Justices Stewart and Rehnquist
found that the fourth amendment provides no protection to individuals
who have not been "seized." Therefore, since Ms. Mendenhall was not
"seized," the stop was outside the parameters of the fourth amend-
ment, and legal. Justices Powell, Burger and Blackmun found that the
seizure was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the fourth amend-
ment. Thus, the Court's decision on these issues supplies the lower
courts with no more guidance than they had previously. Subsequent
decisions of the Supreme Court have not addressed these unresolved
issues, nor provided the lower courts with any additional guidance.
99. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1882. However, the opinion did not state whether the
DEA agents returned to Ms. Mendenhall her identification and airline ticket before
asking if she would accompany them to the airport DEA office. The Fifth Circuit has
held that a seizure occurs when the agents take the suspect's ticket. 592 F.2d 1036.
Logically, an individual is not free to proceed on his own way when he has no ticket
and no identification. If the facts were to establish that the agents kept the documents,
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist should have found a seizure of Ms. Mendenhall at that
instant.
1 156 Nova Law Journal
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In a per curiam opinion in Reid v. Georgia,100 the Supreme Court
did not consider whether an investigatory stop based on the "drug cou-
rier profile" constituted a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. The state court had not analyzed the issue but had as-
sumed that a routine identification stop and questioning constituted a
,,seizure.,,lol1
The Supreme Court disposed of the case on its facts, concluding
that "the agent could not as a matter of law, have reasonably suspected
the petitioner of criminal activity on the basis of [the] observed circum-
stances," 102 which were "too slender a reed to support a seizure."103
Therefore, the DEA agent did not lawfully seize Mr. Reid.0
MS. MENDENHALL'S "CONSENT" TO BE SEARCHED
In Mendenhall, °5 after the majority found that the initial stop
and questioning of Ms. Mendenhall was lawful, it still had to determine
whether she had consented to accompany the federal agents to the air-
port DEA office, and whether she subsequently had consented to a
search of her person. If voluntary consent is found to have been given
by an individual capable of consenting, then such a search, limited to
the scope of the consent, is reasonable under the fourth amendment. 106
Voluntary consent eliminates the necessity for justifying the search
with a warrant or probable cause. In a situation where the prosecution
relies upon "consent" to justify a search, the prosecution has the bur-
den of proving that the consent was voluntary,107 and voluntariness
must be determined by the totality of the circumstances.10 8
The district court had found that Ms. Mendenhall had voluntarily
accompanied the agents to the DEA office in the airport, and her vol-
100. - U.S. ., 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).
101. Id.
102. Id. at ., 100 S. Ct. at 2754.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. - U.S. _, 100 S. Ct. 1870.
106. Scheneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
107. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).




Duggan: Criminal Law: Drug Courier Profiles, United States V. Mendenhall
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
158 Nova Law Journal 5:1980
untary action thereby eliminated the need for probable cause. 109
The majority of the Court, in reviewing the evidence before the
trial court which included no show of force or threats, found that "the
totality of the evidence . . . was plainly adequate to support the Dis-
trict Court's finding that the respondent voluntarily consented to ac-
company the officers . . . . 11
Finally, the Court considered whether the respondent's consent to
the search was "valid." The majority found ample evidence to support
a finding that the consent was voluntary and valid, including: (1) the
respondent was twenty-two years old with an eleventh grade education;
(2) she was expressly told twice she was free to refuse consent; and (3)
she twice "unequivocally" consented to the search.,
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's objective in granting certiorari was to con-
sider "whether any right of the respondent guaranteed by the [f]ourth
[a]mendment was violated.' ' 2 Since the majority found that the initial
stop was lawful, and not violative of any of Ms. Mendenhall's rights
under the fourth amendment, the Court accomplished its goal. How-
ever, the lower courts must still deal with conflicting analyses and ra-
tionales upon which to base future decisions involving investigatory
stops based on less than probable cause such as that supplied by the
"drug courier profile."
Mary Ann Duggan
109. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1879.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 100 S. Ct. at 1879-80.
112. Id. at_, 100S. Ct. at 1873.
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